current
issue > spring
2010
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It
has been 25 years since
Greg Mankiw began teaching
economics at Harvard
College, a position
he continues to enjoy
today. Over the years,
Mankiw has worked inside
and beyond those ivy-covered
walls, most recently
serving as Chairman
of the Council of Economic
Advisors under President
George W. Bush and as
a visiting fellow at
the American Enterprise
Institute. A keen observer
of events, Mankiw is
a regular contributor
to myriad academic and
policy debates; on any
given day, you can find
his thoughts on financial
markets, monetary and
fiscal policy, or economic
growth in the popular
press, academic journals,
and on Squawk Box and
other financial news
media. His depth of
knowledge, dry sense
of humor, and ability
to explain complex ideas
in layman’s
terms make him one of
the top 100 business
bloggers and a favorite
Harvard professor—his
introductory economics
class, colloquially
known as EC 10, is often
the largest class at
the college. Mankiw
lives in Wellesley with
his wife, three children,
and their border terrier,
Tobin.
WellesleyWeston
Magazine: You have had
a remarkable career
both in the public and
private sector. What
is it about economics
that piqued your interest?
Greg
Mankiw: I first became
interested in economics
during my freshman year
at Princeton. One of
my friends was taking
a microeconomics class;
I started reading her
textbook and found that
I like economics, a
lot. In many ways I
am a prototypical economist.
Economists share a couple
of characteristics:
they tend to be naturally
better in math and science—economics
is fairly quantitative—and
they are generally more
interested in public
policy and social issues
than in the substance
of science. I have always
been interested in politics—dinner
conversation in my home
often centered on what
was happening locally
and in Washington. But
politics by itself seemed
vague, random, and subjective.
Economics appealed to
me because it brought
an analytic perspective
to social policy questions.
WW:
Where are we with respect
to the US economy? Technically
we pulled out of a recession
last summer and the
stock market is rallying,
but policymakers continue
to interject stimulus
money into the economy,
credit remains tight,
and unemployment is
quite high. How good
or bad are we, really?
GM: People who study the
aftermath of financial
crises conclude that
recovery typically tends
to be slow; the general
consensus is that this
recovery is likely to
be slower than most.
One of the reasons is
that the Federal Reserve
is running out of ammunition.
In 1982, the last very
deep recession, the
Fed had raised interest
rates to slow inflation,
but that meant that
they had room to cut
rates when they needed
to get out of a recession.
The Fed has cut interest
rates as far as they
can right now. They
are doing other things,
like buying mortgage-backed
securities and commercial
paper, but it is not
clear how much extra
oomph that provides.
We are all in uncharted
water here.
WW:
Have we seen the bottom?
GM: Most economists think
we are close. The way
things typically work
is that there are leading
and lagging indicators.
Financial markets tend
to lead and we have
already seen a huge
run-up in the stock
market since last March.
Then there is usually
an improvement in GDP,
which we are starting
to see. The last to
come are the labor markets.
We have not seen any
turn here, none. But
the fact that the financial
markets have come back
in such a big way makes
one hopeful that within
the next six to twelve
months the labor market
will begin to look better.
That
having been said, I
take all economic forecasting
with a grain of salt.
We economists are notoriously
bad at forecasting.
To some extent that
is because unexpected
things happen. Economic
forecasting is most
useful for contingency
planning: what should
we do if this happens?
WW:
What can we expect a
fully recovered US economy
to look like?
GM: Well, an interesting
question is what the
financial system is
going to look like going
forward. What kind of
regulatory system are
we going to put in place
to minimize the possibility
of this kind of thing
happening again? I would
never say “prevent” because
I don’t
think you can ever fully
prevent these kinds
of things. If you look
at what happened in
this financial crisis,
there were a series
of errors on lots of
people’s
part from regulators
to private firms to
individuals taking on
greater mortgages that
they could afford. No
system can be fully
foolproof. Should we
require financial firms
to have more capital
to absorb losses? Should
firms have to be smaller
so that they are not “too
big to fail”?
Professional economists
are still wrestling
with these questions.
WW:
How necessary has the
government stimulus
been to the economy’s
recovery?
GM: Obama’s
economic team put out
a report in January
2009 that stated that
without the stimulus,
unemployment would rise
to about nine percent,
but with the stimulus
it would peak near eight
percent. Today, unemployment
is over ten percent.
So, what do you make
of that? Either the
stimulus has been a
failure or things were
worse than we originally
thought; unemployment
might be even higher
today if not for the
stimulus. We can’t
know for sure because
this is not a controlled
experiment. I am enough
of a Keynesian to believe
that the stimulus does,
in fact, stimulate,
although I probably
would have emphasized
tax reductions over
government spending
increases. I am nervous
when the government
spends a large sum of
money quickly that it
may not spend it wisely.
I understand Obama’s
rationale: perhaps tax
cuts would not have
stimulated a recovery
quickly enough.
WW:
Should they stop spending
now?
GM: From a short-term perspective,
the economy is still
weak. The trick is balancing
short-run considerations
with long-run considerations.
The long-run fiscal
picture is very bleak.
It was bleak before
the current economic
downturn because the
impending retirement
of the baby boom generation
is going to put tremendous
pressure on entitlement
programs like Social
Security, Medicare,
and, to some extent,
Medicaid. We were on
an unsustainable path
then and our current
path is even more unsustainable.
The Obama Administration
has not realistically
addressed the very big
fiscal hole we will
need to fill going forward.
WW:
What will this bleak
fiscal scenario look
like for our children?
GM: Our children will pay
vastly higher tax rates
than we currently face.
The alternative is to
reduce spending, but
the spending cuts that
are necessary to maintain
our current levels of
taxation are politically
untenable. If I had
my druthers, I would
raise the eligibility
age for Social Security
and Medicare, but that
is a political non-starter.
It
comes down to the classic
economic question: what
is the right trade-off
between equality and
efficiency? The more
robust the social safety
net that you have, the
higher the taxes to
pay for it. We are moving
in the direction of
a more robust safety
net—that
is what the health care
bill is about. We are
going to look more like
Western Europe. Higher
taxes blunt economic
incentive and adversely
affect economic growth,
however. As a result,
our kids will face less
incentive to work than
we have.
WW:
What does that mean
for US competitiveness?
GM: It will slow GDP growth.
That’s
not necessarily the
end of the world. Facing
higher tax rates, Europeans
have developed a culture
that is more leisure-based
than ours; work doesn’t
pay as well at the margin
as it does here. But
that is hardly a catastrophe.
You don’t
look around Paris and
think, “Oh,
these poor people,” but
they are less well off
than Bostonians.
It’s
A Small World
After All
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WW:
In your experience heading
the Council of Economic
Advisors, how much does
economics really affect
public policy?
GM: The Council has only
an advisory function.
It has no decision-making
power over anything.
My day started with
a 7:30 am meeting every
morning in the Roosevelt
Room, the conference
room right next to the
Oval Office, with members
of the White House senior
staff. Everyone was
fully prepared for the
meeting, having already
read the news of the
day. This was quite
a shock for an academic—no
one at Harvard would
ever dream of calling
a meeting at 7:30 am!
I
also met regularly with
the Administration’s
economic policy team—the
head of the National
Economic Council, the
Secretary of the Treasury,
the Commerce Secretary,
and the Head of the
Office of Management
and Budget. We coordinated
the economic policy
effort with a goal of
providing either a recommendation
or a menu of options
for the President to
consider regarding the
economic policy issues
of the day. Several
times a week we would
meet with the President
to discuss the pros
and cons of our recommendations.
Ultimately, he was the
decision maker.
But
that’s
not the end of the story.
When I went down to
Washington, I thought
the political constraints
[on economic policy]
would come through political
advisors, people like
Karl Rove, but they
usually came from Legislative
Affairs, the group that
acts as a liaison between
the President and Congress.
Congress provides powerful
political constraints.
From the outside it
often seems like there
are only two teams in
Washington: Republicans
and Democrats. But it
is really far more nuanced
that. There is the Administration
and the Congress; and
within Congress, there
is the Senate and the
House; and there are
coalitions within each
of them. Everyone is
looking over their shoulder
trying to figure out
what they can get passed;
everyone is promoting
their own agenda. It
is very easy to get
frustrated, thinking, “Gosh,
it’s
really terrible we can’t
get our economic agenda
through and we have
all these great ideas.” But
then you realize that
these checks and balances
are precisely the system
for which the founding
fathers were aiming.
What
to brush up on
your economics?
|
WW:
You teach EC 10, which
often has 700 students
enrolled each year.
Is everyone at Harvard
an economics major?
GM: No, we have roughly
250 economics majors
every year at Harvard
College. Some EC 10
students are economics
majors, but many never
take another economics
course in their lives.
I take it as a very
special opportunity
to help form these future
voters’ ability
to think through economic
policy issues.
WW:
Has your course syllabus
changed much as a
result of recent economic
conditions?
GM: I don’t
think as much as outsiders
think. There is a temptation
to think that all of
economics has to be
rewritten because of
these catastrophic times.
Yet a lot of the basic
rules of economics—supply
and demand and firms
maximizing profit—are
timeless.
What
has changed is emphasis.
Students want to hear
more about the Depression
today. A few years ago,
the Great Depression
looked like a distant
topic in economic history;
now it looks like it
has interesting historical
parallels. Leverage
is another topic. It
is not that no one has
thought about the impact
of leverage before;
rather, it has become
newly relevant to the
world around us.
WW:
You write one of the
most popular business
blogs. How did you
get interested in
blogging?
GM: That was sort of an
accident. It started
as a side effect of
EC 10. I would read
things in the newspaper
and would forward them
to my students if it
related to something
we were doing in class.
Then other people, including
professors at other
schools that were using
my textbook, asked to
be on the e-mail list,
so I just decided that
it would be easier to
have it in the public
domain. Over time the
content has evolved
as the readership has
broadened. I try to
keep it somewhat light.
WW:
What do you like to
do when you are not
thinking about economics?
GM: Deborah and I have three
kids. I am a family
guy, like my father.
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